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It is generally assumed that the right to an impartial and
independent judiciary means that in federal courts, trial and appellate
litigants can be assured that the nation’s Article III judges will not
favor one side, but rather, will neutrally apply the law to a cause
before them.1 One of the fundamental means for making this assumption a reality is for the federal judiciary to adhere to the
Constitution’s separation of powers principle.2 This principle, as originally conceived, was partly designed to prevent the executive branch
from becoming a tyranny.3 Another means is for federal judges to
self-regulate against extra-judicial conduct that aids, or appears to aid,
a party. If one aspect of politicizing the judiciary may be defined as
elite interest groups “capturing the judiciary,” than in the field of
national security, the elite interest group would be the executive
branch’s assertion of national security needs.4 In spite of safeguards,
in the arena of national security, the Constitution’s demand for an
impartial judiciary has, at least in appearance, occasionally proven
illusory because of both the conduct of prominent judges and presidential considerations used in judicial selection. This article reviews

1 See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 514 (1927); Whitaker v. McLean, 118 F.2d 596 (D.C.
Cir. 1941). Clearly, in following Tumey, the right extends to state judiciaries as well. Tumey,
273 U.S. 514; see, e.g., Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 872 (2009).
2 See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 348 (1911). The Court, in Muskrat, quoting
Chief Justice ‘Taney:
The Supreme Court . . . does not owe its existence or its powers to the
legislative department of the government. It is created by the Constitution, and represents one of the three great divisions of power in the
Government of the United States, to each of which the Constitution
has assigned its appropriate duties and powers, and made each independent of the other in performing its appropriate functions. The power
conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required
or authorized to exercise any other.
Id. at 355 (citing Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 699–700 (1865)).
3 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 6 (1976). In its decision, the Court recognized:
The men who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were practical
statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the principle of separation
of powers as a vital check against tyranny. But they likewise saw that
a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one
another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.
Id. at 121.
4 For a definition of the influence of “elites,” see generally NANCY SCHERER, SCORING
POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 11–
27 (2005).
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the historic extra-judicial conduct of judges, national security considerations in the judicial nomination process, and how the judiciary has
enabled a national security recusal exception. Put another way, this
article analyzes how past judicial participation in national security
policies and legislation has contributed to the possibility of undermining judicial impartiality and independence, thereby politicizing the
judiciary and undermining its credibility.
The term “exception,” in this essay, connotes the ability of judges
to engage in extra-judicial conduct favoring the executive branch,
without recusal in national security-related causes of action.5 Extrajudicial conduct includes not only formal involvement in executive
branch programs, but also making speeches favoring governmental
security policies and providing advice to the executive branch.6 For
instance, immediately prior to the United States declaration of war
on the Imperial German Government in 1917, Justice Louis Brandeis
advised General Enoch Crowder on the drafting of the United States’
first national conscription program and then did not recuse himself
from the constitutional challenge to conscription.7 Almost nine decades
later, when Justice Antonin Scalia spoke at the University of Freiburg
in Switzerland, he responded to a question regarding the status of
detained combatants held at Guantanamo, saying, “I had a son on
that battlefield . . . and I’m not about to give this man who was
captured in a war a full jury trial. I mean it’s crazy.”8 When asked
to recuse himself from Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,9 an appeal potentially

See, e.g., Peter Alan Bell, Note, Extrajudicial Activity of Supreme Court Justices, 22
STAN. L. REV. 587, 598–99 (1970) (noting that judicial independence may be endangered by
extra-judicial conduct because of the need for the appearance of impartiality).
6 On defining extra-judicial conduct, see Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judges and Non-Judicial
Functions in the United States, in JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 512, 528–30
(H.P. Lee ed., 2011); Alpheus Thomas Mason, Extra-Judicial Work for Judges: The Views
of Chief Justice Stone, 67 HARV. L. REV. 193, 194–98 (1953); Bell, supra note 5, at 590–98.
7 See, e.g., MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 498 (2012); BRUCE ALLEN
MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF
TWO SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 53 (1982); JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, TO RAISE AND DISCIPLINE
AN ARMY: MAJOR GENERAL ENOCH CROWDER, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S OFFICE AND
THE REALIGNMENT OF CIVIL AND MILITARY RELATIONS IN WORLD WAR I at 81, 144 (2017).
8 See Letter from David H. Remes, Counsel for Amici, to Hon. William K. Suter, Clerk,
United States Supreme Court (Mar. 27, 2006), https://www.scotusblog.com/archives/HamdanRecusalLetter.pdf.
9 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
5
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implicated by his statements, the justice declined.10 Scalia’s decision to
sit on the appeal evidences the exception’s continued life.
In between Brandeis and Scalia, on April 8, 1952, President Harry
S. Truman announced that Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer
would seize privately owned steel mills in an effort to avert a labor
strike.11 The importance of the action directly arose from a significant
national security challenge. The steel produced in the mills was turned
into military hardware–such as tanks, naval vessels, and shells–necessary to support the nation’s war efforts on the Korean peninsula.12 In
announcing his decision, Truman knew a similar seizure had occurred
during World War II, and that Justice Robert Jackson, while earlier
serving as Attorney General, had advised President Franklin Roosevelt
that such property seizures were constitutional in wartime.13 Moreover,
Truman understood that as a general practice, in times of armed
conflict, the federal judiciary often deferred to the actions of the
executive branch.14 Truman had another source of confidence for his
actions; he had long been friends with Chief Justice Fredrick Vinson
who Truman had nominated to the Court. Vinson was a trusted
advisor and he privately assured Truman that the seizure would
survive the Court’s review of the corporation’s challenge.15 The Presi-

Remes, supra note 8.
For a background on Truman’s rationale and decision, see MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN
AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 1–16 (1977); ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 141–43 (1973).
12 See, e.g., PAUL G. PIERPAOLI, JR., TRUMAN AND KOREA: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE
EARLY COLD WAR 169–71 (1999); DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 1069–71 (1992).
13 See, e.g., MARCUS, supra note 11, at 155–56.
14 Id. In 1940, Robert Jackson, while serving as Attorney General, advised Roosevelt that
the government had the authority to seize the nation’s aviation industries in order to
achieve labor peace, although in that instance, the fear of communist led strikes were at
the forefront of his advice. One of the World War II seizures, involving the Montgomery
Ward Corporation, reached the Court through by the time it did, the appeal was moot.
Following the example set in 1940, in World War II, the War Department took control
of over sixty industrial plants. Id. at 39–57. The case stemming from this is United States
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1945).
15 See, e.g., JAMES E. ST. CLAIR & LINDA C. GUIGIN, CHIEF JUSTICE FRED M. VINSON OF
KENTUCKY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 217 (2002); John P. Frank, Conflict of Interest and
Supreme Court Justices, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 744, 748 (1970). It should also be noted that
Truman later insisted his nomination of Vinson to the Court arose after consulting former
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and retired Justice Owen Roberts. See Letter from
Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, to Merlo Pusey, Assoc. Editor, Wash. Post
10

11
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dent and Chief Justice alike were surprised that the Court, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, determined, in a multi-faceted decision,
that the seizure was, in fact, unconstitutional.16 Vinson’s actions in this
case may have stemmed–as Chief Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist
later posited–from his long service in the government, and this disposed Vinson “toward a “practical rather than a theoretical approach[.]”17 But, missing from Rehnquist’s analysis was whether Vinson’s
actions in advising Truman would have undermined the efficacy of
the federal judiciary if the public were to have learned of it at the
time.
This article is divided into three sections, and it incorporates
original research from the personal correspondences of several judges
and justices. The purpose for doing so is not only to bring attention
to various historical vignettes of judicial conduct, but also to make
the point that because national security actions are often cloaked in
secrecy, the discovery of a judge’s extra-judicial conduct might only
occur after the judge has died and a historic repository becomes open
for research. For example, this article includes unpublished correspondences from various judicial collections at the Library of Congress, the
Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan, the Washington and Lee School of Law’s special collections, the Richard Nixon
and Ronald Reagan Presidential Libraries, the National Library of
Australia in Canberra, and Canada’s National Archives in Ottawa.
Secondarily, as a symposium article, it is necessarily brief and
cannot utilize more than a small number of historic instances that a
lengthier article or book treatise would otherwise permit. The first
section analyzes the current framework governing judicial disqualification based on the separation of powers doctrine as well as the
right to an impartial judiciary, beginning with a discussion of Mistretta
v. United States, a non-national security decision.18 This section also
provides examples of how judicial selection based on pre-judicial
service in the national security arena may affect judicial neutrality
and enable a willingness of judges to become involved in extrajudicial activity.
(May 6, 1950) (on file with the National Archives and Records Service); Letter from Harry
S. Truman, President of the United States, to Joe Short (Dec. 19, 1951) (on file with the
National Archives and Records Service).
16 343 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1952).
17 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: REVISED AND UPDATED 172 (1987).
18 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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The second section contains examples of both judicial service on
extra-judicial matters as well as judicial aid to the executive branch.
Lastly, this section provides a comparative framework on how the
Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia, in light
of their national security experiences during the Cold War, have
fashioned rule-sets that serve as barriers to extra-judicial activities.
Canada’s and Australia’s judicial branches have, in fact, taken comprehensive steps outside of the national security arena to ensure that
that the judicial branch remains independent of their respective
elected branches, and it appears that these measures will apply equally
to national security appeals. Section III concludes with an argument
for greater openness in the judiciary, so that historians need not be
the first to assess the propriety of a judge serving over a particular
cause of action.
Finally, before analyzing the intersection between national security and judicial ethics, it is necessary to define “national security,” at
least for the purposes of this article. In part, this is because in recent
years, agencies charged with either militarily guarding the nation or
doing so through a combination of intelligence and diplomacy have
provided an expansive definition, which includes climate change, obesity, access to medicine, and the quality–or lack thereof–of public
education.19 While, from a strategic perspective, this expansive definition may be sound, it becomes too broad for the purpose of this
article. Instead, this article utilizes an older, if not more traditional
definition of national security, such as the one coined by noted
journalist Walter Lippmann in 1943. Lippmann penned that national
security is ensuring “[a] nation has security when it does not have to
sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged,
to maintain them by war.”20 Of course, national security has, and
does, include internal security as it applies to the government’s efforts
to combat internal terrorism, espionage, and treason.21

19 See
JEREMI SURI & BENJAMIN VALENTINO, SUSTAINABLE SECURITY: RETHINKING
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 1–15 (2016).
20 JOSEPH J. ROMM, DEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY: THE NONMILITARY ASPECTS 7 (1993).
21 See, e.g., id. at 1–8.
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MISTRETTA RULE

In 1911, the Court, in Muskrat v. United States22 observed that
the federal government was intentionally “divided into three distinct
and independent branches” and each branch has a duty “to abstain
from, and to oppose, encroachments on either.”23 The appeal arose as
a matter of Indian-treaty and land allocation legislation that placed
into the courts an advisory role outside of the Constitution’s “cases
and controversies,” jurisdictional statement.24 In addition to the Court’s
abstention statement, the justices also noted that in 1793, when Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson asked the Court for an advisory
opinion on a question of foreign policy, the justices demurred from
doing so because it would be a constitutionally improper extra-judicial
activity.25
In 1989 the Court in Mistretta v. United States decided that
federal judicial service on the United States Sentencing Commission–
a legislatively created body to establish criminal sentencing guidelines–
did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.26 Mistretta arose
from a challenge to mandatory sentencing guidelines based on the
fact that the guidelines were enacted by the legislative branch, but
created as a result of presidentially appointed federal judges serving
on the commission and with the commission “located” in the judicial
branch.27 Much of Mistretta focused on Congressional authority to
generally delegate its law-making functions to other agencies, which
had occurred with increasing frequency since the beginning of the
twentieth century, and how this delegation may encroach on the
separation of powers doctrine without violating the Constitution.28 Yet,
the decision incorporated a national security justification to reach its
conclusion.

219 U.S. 346 (1911).
Id. at 352.
24 See, e.g., The Federal Courts May Not Render Declaratory Judgments, 6 N.Y. L. REV.
235, 235 (1928).
25 Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 354.
26 488 U.S. 361, 393, 397 (1989). Mistretta’s main argument was that Congress had
unconstitutionally delegated its law-making authority to an extra-legislative process which
included the input of federal judges. Id. at 371. His secondary argument was that the
service of federal judges on the sentencing commission weakened the judiciary to a less
than co-equal branch of government. Id. at 380.
27 Id. at 380–81.
28 Id. at 379–80.
22
23
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Although Mistretta was not a national security decision, in examining the role of the judiciary in extra-judicial commissions and
investigations, the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Harry
Blackmun, reached into the nation’s legal history–including matters
that could be argued as national security issues–to conclude that not
all extra-judicial conduct violated the separation of powers doctrine.29
Blackmun’s examples included Chief Justice John Jay contemporaneously serving as Ambassador to England, Justice Oliver Ellsworth
serving as Ambassador to France, Justice Owen Roberts serving on
the Pearl Harbor investigation, Justice Robert Jackson serving as a
prosecutor in the Nuremburg Tribunals, and Chief Justice Earl Warren
leading an investigation into the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy.30 Because the appointments of Jay and Ellsworth occurred
during the life of the Constitution’s framers, Blackmun concluded that
the framers had blessed the concept of extra-judicial activity as a
matter of necessity.31 Indeed, Blackmun’s use of Justice Felix Frankfurter’s observation in his Youngstown Sheet & Tube concurrence,
that judges had long-participated in extra-judicial activity, albeit with
reservation and occasional regret, provided evidence of the necessity
of such extra-judicial conduct.32 In the justices’ Mistretta conference
discussions, there was an absence of written concern on the issue of
national security and judicial ethics. Justice John Paul Stevens was
concerned with offending retired Chief Justice Burger because
Blackmun’s original draft noted that Burger had served on the Constitution’s bicentennial commission.33 Justice Anthony Kennedy fretted
about issuing an opinion which might lead critics of the Court to

Id. at 396–402.
Id. at 398–400.
31 Id. at 400–01 (“While these extrajudicial activities spawned spirited discussion and

29
30

frequent criticism, and although some of the judges who undertook these duties sometimes
did so with reservation and may have looked back on their service with regret, `traditional
ways of conducting government . . . give meaning’ to the Constitution.” (citing Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
32

Id.

Letter from John Paul Stevens to Harry A. Blackmun (Dec. 21, 1988), in HARRY A.
BLACKMUN PAPERS, box 1408 (on file with author). In response to Stevens’ concern, Blackmun
erased any mention of Burger’s work on the commission. See, e.g., Letter from John Paul
Stevens to Harry A. Blackmun (Dec. 20, 1988), in HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, box 1408
(on file with author); Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to John Paul Stevens (Dec. 19, 1988),
in HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, box 1408 (on file with author).
33
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believe that the majority had accepted its role as “an imperial judiciary.”34
Seven justices in the majority accepted Blackmun’s historic recitation, and Scalia, in his dissent, did not criticize Blackmun’s historic
analysis. However, Blackmun’s analysis is wholly incomplete and devoid
of a full range of judicial conduct which demonstrates the potential
for harm. Additionally, Blackmun’s use of Frankfurter’s statement is
problematic, if, for no other reason than Frankfurter’s excessive extrajudicial activities.35 Frankfurter had been a long-trusted advisor to
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on matters ranging from economic
recovery to national defense.36 In 1940, Frankfurter approached Loring
Christie, the Solicitor General of Canada, with a proposal for the
United States to assume the defense of Canada if Great Britain were
to fall to Nazi Germany.37 The plan, once signed by Roosevelt and
Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King of Canada, became
known as the Ogdensburg Agreement.38 Certainly the defeat of Nazi
Germany and the survival of western democracy was the paramount
national security consideration in the years 1939–1945. But Frankfurter,
having authored the text of the Ogdensburg Agreement, did not
recuse himself from appeals important to Canada and the United
States. For instance, he participated in Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan in which the court upheld a state anti-discrimination statute
against a Canadian corporation’s maritime challenge. 39 More importantly, he did not recuse himself from participating in a decision
enabling a Canadian maritime company to sue the United States for
the United States Navy’s negligent damage to vessels.40

34 Letter from Anthony M. Kennedy to Harry A. Blackmun (Dec. 19, 1988), in HARRY
A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, box 1405 (on file with author).
35 See, e.g., PETER G. RENSTROM, THE STONE COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 59
(2001).
36 MICHAEL JANEWAY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF ROOSEVELT: BROKERS OF IDEAS AND
POWER FROM FDR TO LBJ 3, 6, 16 (2004).
37 GALEN ROGER PERRAS, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CANADIANAMERICAN SECURITY ALLIANCE, 1933–1945: NECESSARY, BUT NOT NECESSARY ENOUGH 75
(1998).
38 JOHN HERD THOMPSON & STEPHEN J. RANDALL, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES:
AMBIVALENT ALLIES 143 (Lester D. Langley ed., 4th ed. 2008).
39 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
40 Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945).
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Frankfurter’s participation in the Ogdensburg Agreement portended his other efforts to be an instrumental participant in United
States defense policy. In the aftermath of World War II, he worked
with Sir John Latham, the Chief Justice of the High Court of
Australia, in shaping a defense plan for both countries against the
possibility of a resurgent Japan as well as against Soviet expansion
in the Pacific.41 In 1961, Frankfurter counseled Sir Robert Menzies, the
long-serving prime minister of Australia, on the need for him to serve
as a mentor to the recently elected President John F. Kennedy.42 As
in the case of appeals concerning Canada, Frankfurter did not recuse
himself from appeals concerning Australia, though in one significant
matter involving Australia’s internal security, Frankfurter sided with
that country.43 In 1945, he dissented from the Court voiding a decision
to deport Harry Bridges, the president of a powerful longshoreman’s
union, back to Australia on the basis that Bridges concealed his
communist affiliation prior to becoming a United States citizen.44 Had
Bridges been deported to Australia, the Australian government would
have to concern itself with how to corral a powerful labor union
leader accused of fomenting communism.45

A. Judicial Recusal Rules in the Modern Era
In 1911, Congress legislated a statute requiring judicial disqualification when the judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned.46
There were two aspects to the 1911 disqualification statute that provide
41 Letter from Robert Menzies to Felix Frankfurter (July 1, 1951), in PAPERS OF SIR
ROBERT MENZIES, box 12 (on file with author).
42 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Robert Menzies (Feb. 11, 1961), in PAPERS OF SIR
ROBERT MENZIES, box 12 (on file with author). In actuality, Frankfurter’s association with
the High Court began in the 1920s when, as a Harvard Law Professor he discussed the
United States’ involvement in supplying the allies with war material with Justice Henry
Higgins of the High Court in 1916. See Letter from Henry Bournes Higgins to Felix
Frankfurter (Dec. 1918), microformed on FELIX FRANKFURTER PAPERS, box 66, reel 40 (on
file with author).
43 See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
44 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 166–68 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). It could be
argued, however, that Frankfurter argued contrary to the interests of Australia in trying
to uphold the return of a suspected communist to the country of his birth. See, e.g.,
HARVEY KLEHR, THE COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA: A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY
119–20 (2010).
45 See BRUCE NELSON, WORKERS ON THE WATERFRONT: SEAMEN, LONGSHOREMEN, AND
UNIONISM IN THE 1930S at 66–68 (1988).
46 28 U.S.C. £ 455 (2000).
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a framework for this article. The first required a judge to be
disqualified when he or she was directly connected with a party to
a suit.47 The second was that a judge had a duty to inform the
parties of a possible need for disqualification.48 Following this law on
non-national security matters, the federal courts of appeals have a
mixed record regarding whether service on a government-sponsored
investigation or commission later requires recusal. For instance, in
United States v. Payne, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
concluded that a judge who served on a commission investigating the
effects of child pornography on child welfare and safety was not
required to disqualify himself since his service ended prior to the
trial.49 Rules governing judicial ethics have also been developed by
the federal judiciary to prevent the erosion of public confidence in
the judiciary.50 In 1955, in In re Murchison, the Court recognized that
there are reasons to disqualify judges if questions regarding the
apparent impartiality of the judge are significant enough to weaken
public confidence in the fairness of a proceeding.51 In other words,
as the Court noted in Liljeberg v. Health Services, “justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice.”52
In spite of these rules, in at least one instance, a justice decided
not to disqualify himself on the basis of having worked on a national
security project. As an Assistant Attorney General in the Nixon
Administration, William Rehnquist participated in the expansion of a
federal-military surveillance program over persons involved in protesting the Vietnam Conflict and other social inequities.53 However, when
the program came under challenge before the Court, in Laird v.
Tatum, Rehnquist not only disavowed substantively participating in
the program, he cited to instances which favored his retention on
the challenge.54 When President Ronald Reagan nominated Rehnquist
to replace Burger, it became apparent that his participation in the
28 U.S.C. ££ 455(a)–(d) (2000).
28 U.S.C. ££ 455(e)–(f) (2000).
49 944 F.2d 1458, 1477 (9th Cir. 1991).
50 See, e.g., Guide to Judiciary Policy, Ch. 2: Code of Conduct for United States Judges,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united_states_judges_effective_march_12_2019.pdf (last updated Mar. 12, 2019).
51 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Bell, supra note 5, at 615–16.
52 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).
53 See DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE AGE OF DEFERENCE: THE SUPREME COURT, NATIONAL
SECURITY, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 192–93 (2016).
54 409 U.S. 824 (1972).
47
48
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decision was a questionable departure from judicial ethics norms,
though not to the point of the Senate voting against confirmation.55

B. Judicial Nominations
There is little surprise in the appointment of judges who, in
their previous careers, had considerable governmental service or had
assisted a president in a national security or foreign policy related
matter. Exceptional service in governmental operations, after all, distinguishes lawyers for higher governmental positions. Nonetheless, there
are instances in which attorneys have been nominated to judicial
positions because of their past work in the national security arena
and then incautiously determined that there was no reason to recuse.
While Rehnquist provides one example, Justice Abe Fortas provides a
far more egregious example of incautious behavior.
On July 28, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson announced that he
would order 50,000 soldiers to be shipped to South Vietnam, thereby
escalating the conflict from an air war and training mission to an
actual ground war.56 That same day, Johnson nominated Fortas to
the Court; notably, there is a relationship between these two events.57
Before his tenure on the bench, Fortas had served as a personal
counsel and political advisor dating to Johnson’s contested primary
race in 1948 against Texas governor Coke Stevenson and then later
worked as Johnson’s liaison to Juan Bosch–a deposed Dominican
leader–in trying to prevent a Marxist takeover of the Dominican
Republic.58 Fortas continued to advise Johnson after he swore his
judicial oath on August 11, 1965, including on federal efforts to quell
domestic upheaval and in formulating Vietnam policy.59 Fortas never
recused himself from a myriad of decisions involving selective service,
the legality of presidential authority to send conscripted forces to an
undeclared war, or the limits of free speech involving war protests.60

See, e.g., SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 191–200 (1989).
BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE & RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 177
(1988).
57 Id. at 177–78.
58 See, e.g., RICHARD DAVIS, JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND
THE MEDIA 93 (2011).
59 See generally MURPHY, supra note 56, at 177–79.
55

56

60

Id.
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President Nixon nominated Lewis F. Powell to the Supreme Court
for several reasons, including the fact that as a Virginian, Powell
satisfied Nixon’s quest to appoint a conservative southern jurist to the
Court.61 In addition to appeasing his political base in the southern
states as well as northern conservatives, Nixon understood that Powell
had strong national security credentials.62 Powell was not only a World
War II veteran, who served as Special Assistant to the Attorney
General of the United States on selective service matters during the
Truman Administration, but also, under President Dwight Eisenhower,
he was a member of the Joint Civilian Defense Orientation Conference.63 In the year prior to his nomination, Powell–upon Nixon’s
request–served as an advisor to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird on
restoring morale and discipline to the military as well as preparing
the military for its post-Vietnam roles.64 Powell’s service to Laird as a
member of the “Blue-Ribbon Commission” included an intensive study
on preparing the military to engage in “political warfare.”65 In 1978,
Powell described his contributions to the Commission as part of an
effort to keep “the United States [military from] becoming a secondrate power.”66
In December 1979, the Soviet Union sent a large military force
into Afghanistan, drawing intense criticism from President James Earl
Carter as well as the United States’ NATO allies and the government
of the People’s Republic of China.67 During the Nixon administration,
the military shifted from a conscripted force to an all-volunteer force

61 JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY (Fordham Univ.
Press 2001) (1994).
62 Id. Powell had impressive credentials, including, having served as the American Bar
Association President and on President Lyndon Johnson’s Crime Commission. Id.
63 Joint Defense Orientation Conference, Report of the Comptroller General of the
United States, June 29, 1971 (1971). The Conference was formed “to inform business,

professional, and religious leaders on national defense matters in the hopes that, in turn,
they would impart this information to their communities to stimulate support and interest
in DoD activities.” Id. at 2.
64 See, e.g., Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Assoc. Justice, U.S Supreme Court, to Nixon
(June 26, 1970) (on file with author).
65

Id.

Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Assoc. Justice, U.S Supreme Court, to J. Kilpatrick (Nov
29, 1978) (on file with author).
67 JULIAN ZELIZER, GOVERNING AMERICA: THE REVIVAL OF POLITICAL HISTORY 346 (2012).
66
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and the quality of the military was thought to be wanting.68 One of
the Carter administrations’ responses was to reinstitute a part of the
former conscription program, though only so far as to require draft
registration.69 Several appellants opposed the draft registration law
because it exempted women and eventually a challenge to the new
law came to the Court in a case captioned Rostker v. Goldberg.70
Powell, in joining the majority, upheld the draft law, and he embraced
Congress’ as well as the military’s position that because combat positions
were fitted for only males and there were no specific combat roles
for women, he urged that the male-only registration withstood any
level of scrutiny.71 Powell wrote to Rehnquist, who wrote the majority
opinion, “Congress would have been irresponsible to have included
women in the registration/draft law. We already have an army that
probably cannot fight.”72 While there is nothing to suggest that Powell
acted unethically, had he indicated that he worked on rebuilding the
volunteer military a decade before this decision, he could have established a minimum denominator for judicial transparency in the national security arena.
While modern presidential administrations have nominated individuals to the federal judiciary for a variety of reasons, including
their views on federalism, federal civil rights enforcement and prevailing social norms, and beliefs such as abortion rights, President
Ronald Reagan provides another model helpful to understanding how
a judge’s conception of national security may alter the judge’s treatment of the duty of impartiality into a malleable standard. Not unlike
Roosevelt, Reagan selected judges who shared his vision of the government’s national security strategy.73 The defeat of communism, and
not simply the collapse of the Soviet Union, was a key Reagan

68 See,
e.g., JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, SHAPING US MILITARY LAW: GOVERNING A
CONSTITUTIONAL MILITARY 169–71 (2014); see also BETH BAILEY, AMERICA’S ARMY: MAKING
THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 126–29 (2009).
69 BAILEY, supra note 68, at 127–29.; see also JAMES B. JACOBS, SOCIO-LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 95 (1986).
70 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
71 See Letter from Rehnquist to Lewis F. Powell, Assoc. Justice, U.S Supreme Court (May
11, 1981) (on file with author).
72 Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Assoc. Justice, U.S Supreme Court to Rehnquist (May 7,
1981) (on file with author).
73 See, e.g., SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 345 (1997).
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strategy throughout his two terms.74 Two appointments highlight the
underlying national security considerations Reagan placed in his nominees: Laurence Silberman and Robert Bork.
Silberman had a long career in public service and business. In
1981, he sought a position on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.75
“Its purpose, in the past, has been to provide an independent but
supportive advisory role to the President concerning all foreign intelligence activities from the view[]point of effectiveness, consistency with
foreign policy aims and legality[,]”76 Silberman penned to White House
Counsel, H. Monroe Brown.77 “As a former Deputy Attorney General
and Ambassador to Yugoslavia, I have a good deal of background in
the area and should very much like to be of service in such a
periodic advisory role.”78 White House attorneys stressed Silberman’s
ambassadorship to communist Yugoslavia as well as his work in the
Nixon and Ford administrations.79 Certainly, there were other attributes
that made Silberman appealing to the Reagan administration and its
conservative supporters, and he was an eminently qualified nominee.
Silberman stressed that he was anti-busing, anti-affirmative action, and
anti-judicial imperialism.80 After being confirmed to the appellate court,
he generally sided with the government’s stated national security
policies, even in matters of discrimination. For instance, he authored
a decision upholding the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s policy of
excluding gay and lesbian persons from employment in the agency
on the basis of an alleged national security consideration.81 On the
74 EDWARD A. LYNCH, THE COLD WAR’S LAST BATTLEFIELD: REAGAN, THE SOVIETS AND
CENTRAL AMERICA 1–22 (2011).
75 Letter from Laurence H. Silberman to H. Monroe Brown (Feb 6, 1981) (Ronald Reagan
Library – White House Organization Files) (on file with author).

Id.
Id.
78 Id.
76
77

Letter from Christopher Hicks, Associate Director, Presidential Pers., to Silberman, Exec.
Vice President, Crocker Nat’l Corp. (Mar. 2, 1983) (on file with author); Letter from
Silberman, Exec. Vice President, Crocker Nat’l Corp., to Lyn Nofziger, Presidential Assistant,
Political Affairs (Sept. 16, 1981) (on file with author).
80 Letter from Silberman, Exec. Vice President, Crocker Nat’l Corp., to Lyn Nofziger,
Presidential Assistant, Political Affairs (Sept. 16, 1981) (on file with author).
81 Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The last paragraph of the decision is
instruction on Silberman’s deference to the government’s arguments linking national security
and homosexuality. He noted:
Perhaps more important, FBI agents perform counterintelligence duties that
involve highly classified matters relating to national security. It is not irrational
79
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other hand, he chastised his fellow judges who only partially upheld
a government employee drug testing program for relying on the
doctrine of judicial restraint when it had the effect of insulating
other drug-enforcement employees from having to undergo testing in
his Harmon v. Thornburgh concurrence.82 As part of the “war on
drugs,” Harmon clearly falls into the ambit of national security.83
There were many reasons Reagan nominated Robert Bork to the
Court, and national security is overshadowed by the failed confirmation process including Bork’s stance on abortion, affirmative action,
civil rights, and his role in the Justice Department during Watergate.84
Yet, one of the areas that was considered a reason for Reagan’s
nomination of Bork to the highest court was his rejection of congressional standing as it applied to national security programs, as well
as his view that in the late 1970s, Congress had usurped too much
of the executive branch’s national security authority.85 “[H]is separate
opinions in two CIA FOIA cases, Sims and McGehee, suggest a feeling
that application of FOIA to intelligence agencies represents an attempt
by Congress to interfere dangerously with the conduct of the executive
in the vital field of national security[,]”86 the White House report on
Bork read. “Sims was particularly troubling, since it involved an
attempt to obtain through FOIA names of individuals who had
cooperated with the CIA’s MKULTRA project and who therefore were

for the Bureau to conclude that the criminalization of homosexual conduct
coupled with the general public opprobrium toward homosexuality exposes
many homosexuals, even “open” homosexuals, to the risk of possible blackmail
to protect their partners, if not themselves.
Id. at 104. It should be noted, however, that the linkage between homosexuality and
national security was hardly novel by the time of Padula. In 1953, President Dwight
Eisenhower issued Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489, which, among other
aspects, prohibited homosexual persons from obtaining access to national security
positions in the government or private industry. In 1956, the Court upheld the
procedures enumerated for dismissal in the Executive Order. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S.
536, 555–56 (1956).
82 878 F.2d 484, 496 (1989) (Silberman, J., concurring).
83 See, e.g., Rᴏᴍᴍ, supra note 20 at 9–14; EVA BERTRAM, ET AL., DRUG WAR POLITICS:
THE PRICE OF DENIAL 112–17 (1996).
84 See, e.g., NORMAN VIEIRA & LEONARD GROSS, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS: JUDGE
BORK AND THE POLITICIZATION OF SENATE CONFIRMATIONS 9–40 (1998).
85 Report on Bork, in PATRICIA BRYAN PAPERS, box 10 (on file with author).
86 Id. (citation omitted).
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intelligence sources.”87 Additionally, the report stressed that Bork believed a President had the constitutional authority to prevent “dangerous aliens” from entering the country without the denied aliens
having recourse to the courts.88 In addition to these points, on June
29, 1978, Bork testified to the House Judiciary Committee that he
opposed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as both “a thoroughly
bad idea, and almost certainly unconstitutional.”89 Clearly then, Reagan
believed that one of Bork’s attributes was his support for presidential
determinations of national security.

II. JUDICIAL ACTIVITIES, ADVICE, AND ENCOURAGEMENT: TAFT,
STONE, AND BURGER
In 1889, Justice Stephen A. Field corresponded with General
Nelson A. Miles, a decorated veteran of the Civil War and Indian
Wars, who would shortly become the Commanding General of the
Army, on the topic of protecting federal judges.90 Field had been the
target of an assassination attempt and ordered a federal judge to
release a United States Marshal who had killed the would-be assassin.91
He noted to Miles that it might become necessary to require military
protection of judges in certain instances. “Without it,” Field penned,
“there can be no administration of justice upon which the security

87 Id. The Report further noted: Bork’s dissent in Sims, which was somewhat constrained
by his court’s holding in an earlier case, was largely adopted by the Supreme Court when
it reversed the original Sims decision. Id.
88 Id. Finally, Bork’s Abzourek dissent argued in favor of a broad executive power to
exclude dangerous aliens from the country. Id.
89 Statement of Bork, in ROBERT BORK PAPERS – Library of Congress, I:20 (June 29,
1978) (on file with author); Statement of Robert Bork to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence with Reference to the National Intelligence Act of 1978, in ROBERT BORK
PAPERS – Library of Congress, I:20 (June 21, 1978) (on file with author).
90 Letter from Justice Field, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Nelson A. Miles,
Commanding General, United States Army, in NELSON-CAMERON FAMILY PAPERS – Library
of Congress (Oct. 18, 1889) (on file with author). It should be noted that the term
“Commanding General of the Army,” predates the modern term “Chief of Staff of the
United States Army.” For a background on the reason for the military reforms underlying
the change, see RONALD J. BARR, THE PROGRESSIVE ARMY: US ARMY COMMAND AND
ADMINISTRATION, 1870–1914 at 49–122 (1998).
91 For a background on Field’s role in the attempted assassination, see HAROLD HONGJU
KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR 88 (1990).
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of persons and property, and the peace of society largely depend.”92
Within a decade, Miles sought Field’s advice on the use of the Army
in suppressing a major railroad strike that threatened to cripple the
nation’s economy.93 One of the convicted strike leaders, Eugene Debs,
appealed to the Supreme Court, but Field did not find it necessary
to recuse himself from the appeal.94
Field was by no means an aberration in advising a government
security program. In early 1918, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of the national military conscription program.95 During World War I,
Arthur J. Tuttle, a United States District Court judge for the Eastern
District of Michigan, worked with the Army to reduce the number
of court petitions from applicants denied conscientious objection status.
He reviewed hundreds of applications before advising the draft boards
on granting conscientious objector status.96 For denied applicants, he
was able to issue quick rulings sustaining the government’s position
because he had already given advice, if not passed judgment, on
their status.97 Tuttle also presided over the trial of Maurice Sugar, a

Letter from Justice Field, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Nelson A. Miles,
Commanding General, United States Army, in NELSON-CAMERON FAMILY PAPERS – Library
of Congress (Oct. 18, 1889) (on file with author).
93 JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG & ERIC MERRIAM, IN A TIME OF TOTAL WAR: THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE – 1940–1954 at 16–17 (2016).
94 See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). In this decision, labor leader Eugene Debs
challenged a federal judge’s injunction against his labor union striking against the Pullman
Corporation and his subsequent contempt conviction. Id.
95 See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918); CHRISTOPHER CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM
WANTS YOU: WORLD WAR I AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN AMERICAN CITIZEN 21–55
(2008).
96 See, e.g., Letter from C. Lininger to Arthur J. Tuttle, in Arthur J. Tuttle collection
with the University of Michigan Bentley Historical Library (Mar. 24, 1918) (on file with
author); Letter from Henry E. Bodman to Arthur J. Tuttle, in Arthur J. Tuttle collection
with the University of Michigan Bentley Historical Library (Mar. 18, 1918) (on file with
author); Letter from Arthur J. Tuttle to George J. Cummins, Local Bd. for Clare Cty., in
Arthur J. Tuttle collection with the University of Michigan Bentley Historical Library (Apr.
22, 1918) (on file with author).
97 Letter from C. Lininger to Arthur J. Tuttle, in Arthur J. Tuttle collection with the
University of Michigan Bentley Historical Library (Mar. 24, 1918) (on file with author);
Letter from Arthur J. Tuttle to H.O.H. Heistant, Adj. Gen., in Arthur J. Tuttle collection
with the University of Michigan Bentley Historical Library (May 22, 1918) (on file with
author); Letter from Arthur J. Tuttle to George E. Nelson, in Arthur J. Tuttle collection
with the University of Michigan Bentley Historical Library (May 22, 1918) (on file with
author); Letter from Arthur J. Tuttle to Roy R. Davis, Local Bd. Div. 3, in Arthur J.
92
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Socialist Party leader and opponent of the United States participation
in the war.98 There is no indication in the historic record that Tuttle
informed Sugar, or the public, of his draft-board activities.99
After World War II, extra-judicial activity continued in the
national security arena. For instance, President Harry S. Truman appointed Alexander Holtzoff to the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia on September 28, 1945.100 Holtzoff, a 1911
Columbia University Law School graduate and World War I veteran,
also had a distinguished career in the Justice Department prior to his
judicial service.101 Shortly after being appointed to the bench, Holtzoff
was named to a committee, along with Judge Morris Ames Soper
from the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which studied
courts-martial during World War II and the need for reform.102 Their
work resulted in the enactment of the modern Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1950. The UCMJ establishes military trial
procedures and contains statutes prohibiting a wide array of criminal
conduct.103
Having helped craft a modern code of criminal law for the
military, clearly a national security matter as noted from the very
words of the code’s preamble, Holtzoff did not recuse himself from
challenges to the code itself.104 In United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles,
the Court determined that the military could not recall a veteran
non-retiree to active duty for the purpose of a court-martial, because
military jurisdiction only covered active duty service-members and

Tuttle collection with the University of Michigan Bentley Historical Library (Nov. 25, 1918)
(on file with author).
98 See United States v. Sugar, 243 F. 423 (E.D. Mich. 1917); CHRISTOPHER H. JOHNSON,
MAURICE SUGAR: LAW, LABOR, AND THE LEFT IN DETROIT 1912–1950 at 23–39 (1988).
99 See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 98, at 72–73.
100 MARCUS, supra note 11, at 103.
101 See, e.g., Matthew F. McGuire, Judge Alexander Holtzoff – A Vignette, 39 D.C. B.J.
17, 17–18 (1973).
102 KASTENBERG & MERRIAM, supra note 93, at 140.
103 See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 355–56 (John Whiteclay
Chambers II et al. eds., 1999).
104 See JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED
STATES (2019). The preamble reads, in pertinent part, “[t]he purpose of military law is to
promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to
promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to
strengthen the national security of the United States.” Id. at I-1.
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former service-members on retirement status in receipt of pay.105
However, in one of the two district court decisions underlying the
Court’s opinion, Holtzoff merely ordered the Air Force to return Toth
to the United States but implied the military maintained jurisdiction
over him.106 In a second decision, following the government’s motion
for reconsideration, Holtzoff upheld his initial ruling and hinted that
the jurisdictional question would be resolved in the military’s favor.107
In 1958, Holtzoff upheld the military’s assertion of its court-martial
jurisdiction over a civilian contractor working for the military overseas.108 Holtzoff, in essence, sat in judgement of the very law he
helped to create, and this could hardly be assumed to have resulted
in an impartial review, even if his ruling was correctly decided.
One might wonder why Holtzoff felt free to serve on a lawmaking committee and then issue rulings on challenges to the laws
he helped craft. In addition to Field’s discussions with Miles, Brandeis’
advice to the government on the nation’s draft laws, a review of the
conduct of Chief Justice Taft and the Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Stone provides insight into the perceived acceptability of an
exception. There is a difference between the two chief justices. Taft
engaged in political activities, and he did not, as the section below
describes, oppose judicial contributions to the national defense and
foreign policy. Stone, on the other hand, deplored extra-judicial conduct, but did try to stop his peers from doing so.

105 350 U.S. 11 (1955). Toth had served in the United States Air Force and been stationed
in the Republic of Korea. Id. However, by the time the Air Force discovered his role in
a murder, he had served his enlisted term and returned to civilian life. Id. at 13. The
Air Force arrested him and transported him back to Korea for trial. Id. For a background
on the Toth decision, see Joshua E. Kastenberg, Cause and Effect: The Origins and Impact
of William O. Douglas’s Anti-Military Ideology from World War II to O’Callahan v. Parker,
26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 163, 222–23 (2009). At the time of the decision, there were over
twenty-two million Americans who could have been subject to the broad range of military
jurisdiction if the Court had upheld the government’s actions. Id.
106 Toth v. Talbott, 113 F. Supp. 330, 331 (D.D.C. 1953), rev’d, 215 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
rev’d sub nom., U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). Although Toth challenged
the military’s assertion of jurisdiction over him, Holtzoff merely ruled that the arrest and
transport of Toth overseas without a judicial hearing exceeded the military’s authority. Id.
107 Toth v. Talbott, 114 F. Supp. 468 (D.D.C. 1953).
108 United States ex rel. Guaglairdo v. McElroy, 158 F. Supp. 171, 179 (D.D.C. 1958), rev’d,
361 U.S. 281 (1960).
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A. Taft and the National Security Exception
Of all of the twentieth century justices, it might have been the
most difficult for Chief Justice William Howard Taft to contain his
activities to the judicial branch. Taft not only came from a distinguished Ohio family where his father had been attorney general,
secretary of war, as well as minister to both Russia and the Habsburg
Empire, but he also served as solicitor general under President Benjamin Harrison, governor general of the Philippines, secretary of war
under President Theodore Roosevelt, and the nation’s twenty-seventh
president.109 After becoming chief justice, he tried to influence the
1924 Republican nomination to go to Calvin Coolidge by urging
Charles Evans Hughes not to enter the race.110 In 1928, Taft advised
the Ohio’s Republican leadership to back Herbert Hoover against other
potential Republican candidates.111 In addition to his political activities,
Taft also showed an acceptance of judicial involvement in national
security matters.
On October 27, 1917, Walter I. Smith, a judge on the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and an Iowa resident, informed Taft–
then teaching law at Yale University–that he crafted a proposed law
to directly tax communities that failed to purchase their share of
Liberty Loans.112 Smith claimed that since the nation had resorted to
a draft, “it seems unjust that whole German sympathizing townships
refuse to contribute anything to carry on the war while others are
straining every nerve to buy all the Liberty bonds they can.”113 Smith’s
drafting of legislation might have appeared unseemly for a federal
judge to undertake, since the drafting of bills is an inherent function
109 See, e.g., JONATHAN LURIE, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: THE TRAVAILS OF A PROGRESSIVE
CONSERVATIVE 1–20 (2012).
110 Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to George Dewey
(Sept. 8, 1923) (on file with author) (“My own impression is that Coolidge is the one upon
whom more people can agree for re-nomination than anyone else. I talked with Hughes
on the night of the funeral, and suggested that I noted there was a great many people
in the country who would like to see him run for the presidency.”).
111 Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles Curtis,
U.S. Senator and 1928 Republican vice-presidential nominee, in Library of Congress (July
3, 1928) (on file with author). Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court, to Moses Strauss, Editor, Cincinnati Times-Starr, in Library of Congress (July 3, 1928)
(on file with author).
112 Letter from Walter I. Smith, Fed. Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
to William H. Taft, Professor at Yale Law School (Oct. 27, 1917) (on file with author).
113

Id.
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of the legislative branch, and judges who engage in this sort of
extra-judicial conduct may later be reasonably questioned on their
impartiality to oversee the trials of persons charged with failing to
comply with the Selective Draft Law, violating the Espionage Act, or
even in civil disputes between citizens and the War and Naval
Departments. Yet, in his letter, Smith did not merely vent his disgust
with Iowa’s ethnic German population. During the time the Court
deliberated on the Selective Draft Act’s constitutionality, he also forwarded to Justice Willis Van Devanter an analysis of the nation’s
militia laws he and former attorney general George Wickersham had
authored.114 Neither Taft nor Van Devanter left a record indicating
their displeasure with Smith’s actions.
In contrast to Taft’s deference for extra-judicial activity in
national security matters, he opposed extra-judicial activity in law
enforcement. In 1929 President Hoover initiated a commission, the
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, to investigate crime and police conduct in the United States.115 Colloquially
known as the Wickersham Commission after its leader, former Attorney General George Wickersham, the investigation included future
justices Frankfurter and Douglas.116 Hoover, however, tried to lobby
Taft to appoint Justice Harlan Stone prior to appointing Wickersham.117
Taft resisted the appointment, describing to his son:
I have been going through, as you perhaps know, a major trial with
Hoover, in which he has attempted to take from our Court, his favorite
Stone. I opposed it and made some other suggestions which did not suit

114 Id.; Letter from William Van Devanter, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to
Walter I. Smith, Fed. Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Jan. 8, 1917)
(on file with author).
115 Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., One Man in His Time, 78 HARV. L. REV. 7, 21 (1964).
116 See, e.g., BRAD SNYDER, THE HOUSE OF TRUTH: A WASHINGTON POLITICAL SALON AND
THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 544 (2017); Robert W. Gordon, Professors and
Policymakers: Yale Law School Faculty in the New Deal and After, in HISTORY OF THE
YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE TERCENTENNIEL LECTURES 110 (2004).
117 Letter from Herbert Hoover, U.S. President, to William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S.
Supreme Court (Apr. 7, 1929) (on file with author) (writing “I have received your message
indicating that it was your purpose to review the question of Justice Stone’s undertaking
the chairmanship of the Law Enforcement Commission. I can scarcely express my anxiety
that you will be able to acquiesce in that suggestion. I realize the extra burden it imposes
on the Court . . . .”).
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him as he hammered at me through Stimson and through the Attorney
General.118

Taft simply did not want Stone serving as an investigator over
the causes of crime and then having to decide appeals which could
have been implicated by his extra-judicial service.119
Although Taft was reticent to have his fellow justices become
involved in the non-national security extra-judicial functions of the
government, he was not above giving advice to legislators and the
President in regard to military affairs. He encouraged President Warren G. Harding to enter into an international maritime arms limitations
treaty known as the Washington Naval Treaty.120 In the aftermath of
World War I, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, France,
Italy, and Japan agreed that one of the contributing factors to the
global conflict had been an unprecedented arms production race to
ensure the expansion of colonial empires and dominance of the high
seas, and therefore limitations on battleships and other naval tonnage
would ensure international peace.121 Taft had long been supportive of
international peace efforts, including working with billionaire Andrew
Carnegie and endorsing the League of Nations.122 When Taft was
Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert Taft, son
of William H. Taft (Apr. 7, 1929) (on file with author); Letter from William H. Taft,
Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Herbert Hoover, U.S. President (Apr. 8, 1929) (on file
with author).
119 See Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Herbert
Hoover, U.S. President (Apr. 8, 1929) (on file with author); see also Letter from William
H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert Taft, son of William H. Taft (Apr.
7, 1929) (on file with author).
120 See generally Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to
Horace Taft, brother of William H. Taft (Nov. 29, 1921) (on file with author) (writing “I
saw Harding yesterday. He is very serious about the Conference and tells me that things
are working well and that they are going to get something real out of it. He complained
that Borah and others were, as he said, “crabbing” the situation. I told him I would send
him a little memorandum I had of what Lincoln said about complaints of an Administration in order to cheer him up at times . . . . As Root told me that he thought the
thing as going to be a success, Harding’s assurance is a confirmation.”).
121 RICHARD W. FANNING, PEACE AND DISARMAMENT: NAVAL RIVALRY & ARMS CONTROL
1922-1933 at 1–18 (1995) (noting that the American delegation worked to ensure continued
United States naval superiority over other nations, particularly in regard to the Pacific
Ocean, except for Great Britain).
122 See Frank, supra note 15, at 744; JOSEPH FRAZIER WALL, ANDREW CARNEGIE 977–78
(1970); LEWIS L. GOULD, CHIEF EXECUTIVE TO CHIEF JUSTICE: TAFT BETWIXT THE WHITE
HOUSE AND SUPREME COURT 41 (2014). Taft’s reputation for supporting international peace
negotiations led to Tomas Masyryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia and President
118
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confirmed as Chief Justice, Judge George E. Martin of the Court of
Customs Appeals penned “the cause of constitutional government in
this country is advanced, and our influence upon other nations is
promoted by the appointment[,]”123 evidencing that at least one judge
believed Taft would work to advance the nation’s foreign policies.124
In this instance, Taft’s encouragement to Harding to seek peace
through arms reductions while ensuring United States naval dominance
was clearly an action of advising a president on a national security
matter.

B. Stone: Opposition to Extra-judicial Conduct but Resistance to
his Example
As Chief Justice, Harlan Stone was displeased with his fellow
justices who engaged in extra-judicial activity in support of the war
effort. He wrote to Professor Charles Fairman that he had “great
difficulty” in reconciling Justice Robert Jackson’s service on the Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal.125 The war crimes trials of Nazi and
Japanese officials created an international precedent to limit warfare
to combatants and deter crimes against humanity, and in this sense,
there was a national security component to the war crimes trials.126
But, Stone had worked in the national security arena himself and
understood the implications to the independent judiciary. In the year
after Hitler came to power, Stone–as evidenced below–tried to intercede on behalf of men who had been convicted under the 1917
Selective Service Act for defying orders to report to military service.
He had a personal connection to a number of men who were denied
conscientious objector status and convicted for refusal to join the
Eleftherios Kyriakou Venizelos, the president of Greece, asking him to campaign for the
League of Nations. See, e.g., Letter from William H. Taft to Thomas Mazaryk, President
of Czechoslovakia (Sept. 23, 1919) (on file with author); Letter from William H. Taft to
Eleftherios Kyriakou Venizelos, President of Greece (Sept. 23, 1919) (on file with author).
123 Letter from George E. Martin, Judge, U.S. Court of Customs Appeals, to William
Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, in WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT PAPERS, Reel
228, Library of Congress (July 1, 1921) (on file with author).
124

See id.

Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles Fairman,
in HARLAN FISK STONE PAPERS, Box 45, Library of Congress (Mar. 13, 1946) (on file with
author). It should be noted, however, that Jackson recused himself from serving on the
appeals of persons charged with war crimes in Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
126 See, e.g., KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1–17 (2011).
125
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Army in World War I. In 1918, as dean of Columbia University’s law
school, Stone agreed to serve on an administrative panel reviewing
the World War I criminal convictions of conscientious objectors.127
Julian Mack, a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
(and later Second Circuit), served alongside Stone on a number of
conscientious objection appeals.128 Like Judge Walter Smith and Arthur
Tuttle, Mack did not recuse himself from conscription cases.129
After being appointed to the Court by President Coolidge, dozens
of applicants who had been denied relief from the wartime board
began to petition Stone, and in several instances, Stone appealed to
President Franklin Roosevelt to grant pardons. On November 28, 1934,
Stone wrote to Roosevelt that, regarding Mr. Brent Allinson, he was
“convinced of his sincerity and that his conduct was attributable to
a conscientious objection to war[.]”130 To another applicant who Stone

127 Laura M. Weinrib, Freedom of Conscience in War Time: World War I and the Limits
of Civil Liberties, 65 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1097–98 (2016); see Letter from James M. Good, Sec’y
of War, U.S., to Harlan F. Stone, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, in HARLAN FISK STONE

PAPERS, Box 45, Library of Congress (May 30, 1929) (on file with author); letter from
James M. Good, Sec’y of War, U.S., to Harlan F. Stone, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court,
in HARLAN FISK STONE PAPERS, Box 45, Library of Congress (May 2, 1929) (on file with
author).
128 See, e.g., Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: In Defense of Individual
Freedom, 1918-20, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 147, 147–48 (1951); Dennis J. Hutchinson, The BlackJackson Feud, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 204–05 (1988). Although the judicial ethics rules did
not expressly prohibit a judge from having a friend appear as counsel in a pending case,
it is worthy to note that in 1945 Justice Robert Jackson excoriated Justice Hugo Black
over a similar issue. See Letter from Stone, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Kellen,
The New School for Social Research, in HARLAN FISK STONE PAPERS, Box 45, Library of
Congress (Feb. 25, 1944) (on file with author) (“I shall always look back at my association
with Judge Mack as a most agreeable experience. We became fast friends and saw each
other on occasion in later years . . . before his death. After the war, I occasionally
appeared before him when he was sitting as a judge in New York City.”). See, e.g.,
KASTENBERG & MERRIAM, supra note 93, at 86–87. The decision, while it arose from a
union-labor dispute, had national security implications in that a labor strike in the coal
or steel industry in the early Cold War, could lead to the Soviet Union’s leaders believing
the United States would be unable to supply its military with munitions. Id.
129 See, e.g., Snitkin v. United States, 265 F. 489 (7th Cir. 1920) (reversing a conviction
and not siding with the government).
130 Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Franklin D.
Roosevelt, President, U.S., in HARLAN FISK STONE PAPERS, Box 45, Library of Congress (Nov.
28, 1934) (on file with author). But see Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, U.S.,
to Harlan F. Stone, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, in HARLAN FISK STONE PAPERS, Box
45, Library of Congress (Dec. 24, 1934) (on file with author). Roosevelt had a different
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rebuffed, he wrote that while he respected the “extreme position” of
conscientious objectors they “should accept the consequences without
complaint[.]”131 Perhaps, presaging how he would vote in the World
War II appeals of conscientious objectors to the Court, Stone ended
his letter with:
Organized society is as much a reality as ice and snow in the arctic. It
must function by majorities, it contemplates that minorities who are
against all war or a particular war may vote or speak against it, but it
cannot admit of the right of minorities to resist it.132

Justice Owen Roberts served on two significant national security
extra-judicial investigations contemporaneous with his judicial service.
In 1932, President Herbert Hoover appointed Roberts to serve as an
umpire over German monies held by the United States Treasury
Department under a World War I settlement agreement with Germany.133 Two years earlier, Hoover had nominated Roberts to the
Court.134 In 1916, a German act of sabotage against a munitions storage
unit in New Jersey resulted in the deaths of four United States
citizens, injuries to hundreds more, and property damage in excess of
millions of dollars.135 In 1930, the Lehigh Valley Railroad sued a joint
German-American commission over the award of monies to other
plaintiffs.136 As an umpire, Roberts determined that because the commission was entitled to determine its own jurisdiction, and that the
German government had presented false evidence to the commission,

view of Allinson after Allinson refused to pledge an oath of allegiance to the United
States.
131 Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Fred Breihl (Mar.
4, 1936) (on file in Harlan Fisk Stone Papers, Box 45, Library of Congress).
132 Id.; see Letter from Fred Breihl, to Harlan F. Stone, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of
the U.S. (March 20, 1936) (on file in Harlan Fisk Stone Papers, Box 45, Library of Congress)
(“Modern wars and imperialism spring from the capitalist system. Someday the working
class will abolish that system . . . .”).
133 Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 311 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1941); John J. McCloy,
Owen J. Roberts’ Extra Curiam Activities, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 350, 350–51 (1955).
134 Erwin N. Griswold, Owen J. Roberts as a Judge, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 332, 333, 348 n.43
(1955).
135 HENRY LANDAU, THE ENEMY WITHIN: THE INSIDE STORY OF GERMAN SABOTAGE IN
AMERICA 80 (1938); see McCloy, supra note 133. According to McCloy, who represented the
Lehigh Valley Railroad, Hoover selected Roberts because of Roberts’ service to the government in investigating corruption in the leasing of oil fields in what became known as
the “Teapot Dome Scandal.” Id.
136 Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp., 311 U.S. at 482–83.
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he ordered the investigation into German sabotage reopened.137 In 1939,
after the German representative to the commission withdrew from
the investigation under protest, Roberts ordered the commission to
reassess its award in favor of the railroad company.138 In turn, the
Court upheld Roberts’ authority against a challenge from two companies that contested the award to the railroad.139
Shortly after the Japanese surprise attack on the Pearl Harbor
naval base and other United States military installations in the Pacific,
President Roosevelt appointed Roberts to lead an investigation into
the military’s preparedness for an enemy attack.140 Roosevelt believed
that Roberts–having been appointed by a Republican president–would
provide public confidence to the investigation’s findings.141 The Pearl
Harbor investigation concluded that the Japanese attack was a surprise,
although the Army and Navy command in Hawaii were culpable in
failing to adequately prepare for a surprise attack.142 While no appeals
from the December 7 surprise attack came to the Court, there was
the possibility, however remote, that one of the dismissed military
commanders would have appealed.
On March 20, 1945, Roosevelt sent General William Donovan, the
commander of the Office of Strategic Services–the predecessor of the
Central Intelligence Agency–to see if Justice William O. Douglas could
advise the administration on the asylum rights of political refugees
in non-belligerent countries.143 Roosevelt worried that Switzerland, Sweden, Ireland, Portugal, the Vatican, Turkey, and Argentina would offer
asylum to Nazi war criminals, such that had enabled Kaiser Wilhelm
II to escape prosecution in the Netherlands after World War I.144
Douglas’ memoirs are silent on this request, and what remains in his

Id. at 483–84.
Id.
139 Id. at 489.
140 See McCloy, supra note 133, at 352; ALAN SCHOM, THE EAGLE
137
138

AND THE RISING SUN:
THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN WAR, 1941–1943 at 148–49 (2004); GREG ROBINSON, A TRAGEDY OF
DEMOCRACY: JAPANESE CONFINEMENT IN NORTH AMERICA 79–80 (2009).
141 Lance Cole, Special National Investigative Commissions: Essential Powers and Procedures

(Some Lessons from the Pearl Harbor, Warren Commission, and 9/11 Commission Investigations), 41 MCGEORGE L. REV 1, 9–10 (2009).
142 Id. at 13.
143

Memorandum from Gen. William Donovan to J. William O. Douglas (Mar. 20, 1945),

in WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS PAPERS, (Library of Congress) (on file with author).
144 Id.
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personal papers is a cryptic note to Donovan that he did not consider
non-belligerent governments as possessing the right to offer asylum to
persons charged with an international tribunal. Cognizant of Stone’s
anger with Murphy, Roberts, and Jackson, Douglas did not formally
offer any assistance to Donovan.145
Although Douglas declined to personally participate in extrajudicial committee work during the war, judges on the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and its district court judges–which he
oversaw as his assigned circuit–were involved in various wartime
committees and planning, with his approval. For instance, he approved
of Judge William Denman’s extensive work not only in planning port
and factory defenses on the west coast against a Japanese attack, but
also Denman’s repeated advice to James Forrestal and John J. McCloy,
two men in the Roosevelt administration instrumental in the national
defense.146 Denman, in his statements to McCloy and Forrestal, referred
to Governor Earl Warren as “a tragically pathetic commander-in-chief”
and sought greater federal military control over the state police.147
There is no record Douglas disapproved of Denman’s conduct.

C. Warren Burger and the Encouragement of Nixon
The Vietnam Conflict resulted in the twentieth century’s greatest
period of domestic upheaval.148 While, from 1964 through 1969, much
of the dissension against the war focused on President Lyndon Johnson’s wartime policies, including a national conscription program which
favored exemptions for wealthy and largely Caucasian males, by 1970
public dissension turned to Nixon’s expansion of the war into Cambodia.149 On April 30, 1970, Nixon informed the nation that the United
States military forces, with the Army of the Republic of South
Vietnam, had entered into Cambodian territory for the purpose of
145

Id.

Letter from J. William Denman to J. William O. Douglas (June 17, 1947), in WILLIAM
O. DOUGLAS PAPERS, (Library of Congress) (on file with author).
147 Commonwealth Club Plan, Memorandum from J. William Denman to J. William O.
Douglas, in WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS PAPERS, (Library of Congress) (on file with author).
148 See, e.g., JEFFREY W. KNOPF, DOMESTIC SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION:
THE IMPACT OF PROTEST ON US ARMS CONTROL POLICY 167–69 (1998); RODERICK A.
FERGUSON, WE DEMAND: THE UNIVERSITY AND STUDENT PROTESTS 12–17 (2017).
149 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 31–32 (1993); GLENN L. STARKS & F. ERIK BROOKS, THURGOOD
MARSHALL: A BIOGRAPHY 93–95 (2012).
146
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eliminating “a major Communist staging and communications area,”
and ensuring the success of Vietnamization.150
Almost immediately after Nixon’s television address, Chief Justice
Warren Burger wrote Nixon in support of the military operation.
“Very properly, the White House lines and all Western Union lines
are blocked with loyal Americans who wish to express their support
for your courageous decision,”151 Burger exclaimed. “Whatever comes,
there is no substitute for courage in a time of crisis and you have
shown that tonight.”152 Burger’s note to Nixon was not without some
parallel. On November 13, 1928, Stone wrote President Calvin Coolidge
a note lauding the president’s speech on disarmament and the settlement of France’s wartime debt to the United States.153 However, Stone’s
letter did not occur during an ongoing unpopular military conflict
that resulted in dozens of legal appeals through the circuit courts.
On April 30, 1970, Burger did more than write Nixon a letter;
he personally brought the letter to the White House and favorably
compared the President’s resolve against the press to the actions of
George Washington and Abraham Lincoln.154 That there was a substantial likelihood that the Supreme Court would decide appeals on
the legality of the incursion, as well as the First Amendment assertions
of the news media and war protesters, seemed not to matter to
Burger. For instance, when, in 1974, the Court reversed a conviction
of a defendant charged with the “improper use” of the United States
flag after the defendant displayed the flag with a peace symbol
following the Cambodian invasion, Burger dissented on the basis that
the Court expanded its constitutional role.155
Robert B. Semple Jr., Nixon Sends Combat Forces to Cambodia to Drive Communists
Staging Zone, N.Y. TIMES: ARCHIVES (May 1, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/05/01/archives/nixon-sends-combat-forces-to-cambodia-not-an-invasion-president.html.
151 Letter from Warren Berger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Richard Nixon,
President, U.S. (Apr. 30, 1970), in PERSONAL NAME FILES (Richard Nixon Library) (on file
with author).
150

from

152

Id.

Letter from J. Harlan Fiske Stone to Calvin Coolidge, President, U.S. (Nov. 13, 1928),
in HARLAN FISKE STONE PAPERS (Library of Congress) (on file with author).
154 Letter from Warren Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Richard Nixon,
President, U.S. (May 10, 1971) (on file with author); Letter from Richard Nixon, President,
U.S., to Warren Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (May 12, 1971) (on file with
author).
155 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 416 (1974) (Burger, J., dissenting). Burger penned:
153
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Burger was by no means alone in supporting Nixon’s decision
to send forces into Cambodia. On May 11, 1970, Roger Robb, a judge
on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, penned to
Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst not only a historical
justification for the Cambodian operation but also the basis for an
administration official’s potential public speech.156 “As a student of the
Civil War I have been impressed by several parallels between events
of the spring and summer of 1864 and what is happening now[,]”157
Robb wrote. “This look at history strengthens my confidence that Mr.
Nixon’s courageous and decisive actions in Vietnam and Cambodia
will be vindicated by results.”158 In Priest v. Secretary of the Navy,
Robb voted to uphold the court-martial conviction of a sailor who
‘colorfully’ criticized Nixon’s Vietnam and Cambodia policies without
noting his support to Nixon.159
Burger was also not the only post-Fortas justice to provide
national security advice to a national leader. On March 13, 1977, future
president George H.W. Bush presented the commencement speech to
the University of Houston summer graduates.160 In it, he criticized
President Carter’s human rights policies in foreign affairs as interfering
with the domestic affairs of allied nations and aiding communist

If the constitutional role of this Court were to strike down unwise laws or
restrict unwise application of some laws, I could agree with the result reached
by the Court. That is not our function, however, and it should be left to
each State and ultimately the common sense of its people to decide how the
flag, as a symbol of national unity, should be protected.

Id.
156 Roger Robb, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, to Richard Kleindienst, Deputy Att’y
General, Dep’t of Justice (May 11, 1970) (on file with author).
157
158

Id.
Id. Robb finished his letter by writing:
Of course Mr. Lincoln did not have critics urging that General Grant
refrain from crossing the Rapidan, or that General Sherman remain in
Chattanooga to avoid the risk of escalation; but in many ways the
troubles of 1864 resembled the ones we have today. I predict that the
historical parallel will continue, with success in Cambodia and Vietnam
bringing us fair skies `if our people at home will be but true to
themselves.’

Id.
570 F.2d 1013, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
George H. W. Bush, Commencement Address at University of Houston (Aug. 13, 1977)
(on file with author).
159

160
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insurgent movements in Latin American and African nations.161 Moreover, Bush accused Carter of creating a “double standard,” which
excused neutral totalitarian governments, or those allied with the
Soviet Union and China.162 Shortly after reading the speech, Powell
sent a congratulatory letter to Bush, criticizing Carter’s foreign and
military policies: “Communism and neo-Communism have steadily
gained ground . . . since the end of World War II[,]” Powell claimed,
“[e]vents in East Africa at this time demonstrate . . . that we no
longer have the will to challenge even if we have the means.”163 Two
months later, Powell wrote to General George Brown that Carter’s
national security and military policies had “endangered if not foreclosed” the ability of the United States to come to the aid of the
free world.164 In 1979, Powell warned Senator William Cohen–a future
secretary of defense–that based on his past service on the Blue
Ribbon Defense Panel, if the United States signed a new Strategic
Arms Limitations Treat (SALT II), the United States would decline
further as a world power and communism become more influential.165

D. The Canadian and Australian Experience and Answer
The problems of extra-judicial activities are not confined to the
United States, and indeed, two of the constitutionally based legal
systems with substantial similarities to the United States have witnessed
appellate judges appointed to commissions related to the national
security of their respective countries. In 1942, the Governor General
of Canada appointed Chief Justice Lyman Duff of the Supreme Court
of Canada to lead an investigation into the defeat of Canadian forces
against the Japanese in Hong Kong.166 Shortly after the United States
joined with the United Kingdom and Soviet Union in World War II,
the Canadian Government–then a part of the British Empire–permitted
161
162

Id.
Id.

163 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to George H. W. Bush (Mar.
4, 1978) (on file with author).
164 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to George S. Brown, Gen.,
U.S. Air Force (June 27, 1978) (on file with author).
165 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to William S. Cohen, Senator,
U.S. Senate (Mar. 5, 1979) (on file with author).
166 LYMAN P. DUFF, REPORT ON THE CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO THE CROWN
COLONY OF HONG KONG 2 (1942); A.R. Menzies, Canadian Views of United States Policy
Towards Japan, 1945–1952, in WAR AND DIPLOMACY ACROSS THE PACIFIC, 1919-1952 at 15960 (A. Hamish Ion & Barry D. Hunt eds., 1988).
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American military forces and U.S. citizens involved in defense construction projects to be stationed in Canada.167 Chief Justice Thibadeau
Rinfret and Justice Ivan Rand of the Canadian Supreme Court headed
a commission to establish limitations on Canada’s criminal and civil
jurisdiction over U.S. citizens and soldiers involved in the protection
of Canada.168 In 1945, in Canada, the Governor General, on the advice
of Prime Minister William Lyon McKenzie King, appointed Supreme
Court Justice Roy Lindsay Kellock to lead an investigation into a
mass riot of Canadian naval personnel in Halifax, Nova Scotia.169 The
following year, in a similar process, Kellock, along with Supreme Court
Justice Robert Taschereau, investigated a far graver national security
matter: Soviet espionage in Canada and the United States.170 Known
as the Kellock-Taschereau Investigation, the justices approved of se-

DUFF, supra note 166; Menzies, supra note 166.
IVAN RAND, IN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE AS TO WHETHER MEMBERS OF THE
MILITARY OR NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ARE EXEMPT FROM
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN CANADIAN CRIMINAL COURTS, in National Archives of Canada
(1943) (on file with author) (Can.) (During World War II, the Canadian provincial governments were concerned that the thousands of Americans employed building the Alaska
Highway were shielded from Canadian criminal and civil jurisdiction, but Rinfret concluded
that as long as the United States prosecuted the criminal conduct of it military personnel
and repaid Canadian citizens for damages, the exemption from jurisdiction comported with
international law).
169 R. L. KELLOCK, REPORT ON THE HALIFAX DISORDERS, MAY 7-8, 1945 (1945) (Can.). On
May 7, a victory celebration in Halifax evolved into a riot when thousands of Canadian
sailors were permitted to leave their ships and protested the high price of alcohol and
the lack of accommodations by setting fire to buildings, tram cars, and looting stores. For
information on the riot, see Marc Millner, Rear Admiral Leonard Warren Murray: Canada’s
Most Important Operational Commander, in THE ADMIRALS: CANADA’S SENIOR NAVAL
LEADERSHIP IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 118–19 (Michael Whitby et al. eds., 2006).
170 ROBERT TASCHEREAU & R. L. KELLOCK, THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION 7
(1946) (Can.). In 1945, Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet Union citizen, assigned as a cypher clerk in
the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa and provided Canadian and British intelligence with
information that the Soviet Union had obtained information on nuclear weapons projects
from scientists working on the Manhattan Project and that there were Soviet Agents in
the Canadian government. AMY KNIGHT, HOW THE COLD WAR BEGAN: THE IGOR GOUZENKO
AFFAIR AND THE HUNT FOR SOVIET SPIES 30–34 (2005). The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) also participated in questioning Gouzenko and learned of communist activities in the
United States. Id. at 39. The Canadian member of Parliament, Fred Rose was convicted
of espionage and sentenced to six years in prison. See DAVID LEVY, STALIN’S MAN IN
CANADA: FRED ROSE AND SOVIET ESPIONAGE 150 (2011). To date, he is the highest-ranking
Canadian government official to be convicted of a crime. See id. at 151.
167
168
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cretive questioning and the temporary imprisonment of suspects without access to the courts, which resulted in over ten convictions,
including a member of the Canadian Parliament.171
In 1954, another Soviet government official defected to the west
and promised information on Soviet espionage activities involving the
host government’s officials, this time in Australia. Known as the Petrov
Affair, Prime Minister Menzies appointed three judges from three of
the Australian states’ highest courts to investigate how far the Soviet
Union and the Australian Communist Party had penetrated into the
government.172 Initially, Menzies sought Chief Justice Sir Owen Dixon
of the High Court to head the investigation but Dixon, perhaps
realizing the problems inherent in Kellock’s and Taschereau’s appointments in Canada, demurred and advised Menzies to select judges who
were not a part of the nation’s court of last resort.173 Still, the fact
that three judges, Justice William Owen of the Supreme Court of
New South Wales, Justice George Coutts Ligertwood of the South
Australian Supreme Court, and Justice Roslyn Philp of the Queensland
Supreme Court, were appointed by Menzies underscored that the
judges had departed from their judicial duties and were subject to
the prime minister.174 In 1950, with his party in the majority in the
Australian Parliament, Menzies tried to outlaw the Communist party
of Australia, but by 1955 his party had lost popularity.175 The Petrov
Affair was partly responsible for Menzies and his Conservative Party
defeating a Labour Party challenge, led by his opponent Herbert V.
Evatt, in late 1955.176
Although one could argue that because the Supreme Court of
Canada and the High Court of Australia were not, until 1949, courts
of final review, aggrieved appellants could always appeal to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.177 However, given the few
appeals that the Judicial Committee took from either of the two
J. PATRICK BOYER, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE: HOW ‘VINEGAR JIM’ MCRUER BECAME
CANADA’S GREATEST LAW REFORMER 190–93 (2008).
172 ROBERT MANNE, THE PETROV AFFAIR: POLITICS AND ESPIONAGE 114–16 (1987).
173 Id. at 114.
171

174

Id.

DAVID LOWE, MENZIES AND THE `GREAT WORLD STRUGGLE’: AUSTRALIA’S COLD WAR,
1948–1954 at 65 (1999).
176 Id. at 123–24.
177 NICHOLAS ARONEY ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA:
HISTORY, PRINCIPLE, AND INTERPRETATION 31 (2015).
175
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Dominions, it was unlikely that any of the persons denied financial
redress from the Halifax Riot, or from the conduct of United States
military personnel in Canada, or the persons imprisoned or convicted
as a result of the Kellock-Taschereau Investigation would find a
receptive Privy Council, or for that matter, would any aggrieved
person challenging the use of judges in Australia’s Petrov Inquiry.
Since 1957, the High Court has determined that extra-judicial
activities in matters not directly related to the judicial branch undermine judicial independence.178 The decision, titled Kirby ex Parte Boilermakers, arose from a communist-oriented labor union’s challenge to
the government’s appointment of judges to arbitration courts, when
the arbitration decisions ordering unions to return to work would be
appealed to the judicial branch.179 The High Court concluded that
Australia’s judges could not be vested with any legislative or administrative power without violating the independence of the judicial
branch.180 In 1996, the High Court of Australia once more determined
that extra-judicial activities at the behest of the government compromised judicial independence to the point of incompatibility for judicial
service in a decision unrelated to national security.181 In 1982, Canada
adopted the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but while the Charter
has not expressly prohibited the use of judges on inquiries, it is clear
through its language that the use of judges to perform executive or
legislative functions is impermissible.182

R v. Kirby (1956) 94 CLR 254 (Austl.).
Fiona Wheeler, The Boilermakers’ Case, in AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARKS
160, 164–66 (H.P. Lee & George Winterton eds., 2003).
180 Kirby, 94 CLR at 298.
181 Wilson v. Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189
CLR 1 (Austl.) (arising from a challenge to the appointment of Justice Jane Matthews
from the Federal Court of Australia–a court which determines civil cases and appeals
arising from challenges to statutes and whose decisions are appealable to the High Court
of Australia–to prepare a report as to whether the construction of a bridge violated the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984). In Wilson, the High
Court held: “no function can be conferred that is incompatible either with the judge’s
performance of his or her judicial functions or with the proper discharge by the judiciary
of its responsibilities as an institution exercising judicial power.” Id. at 17. It would appear,
from the language of this decision, that the use of judges, such as had occurred in the
Petrov Inquiry, would no longer be permissible.
182 See, e.g., Patrick Monahan & Byron Shaw, The Impact of Extra-Judicial Service on
the Canadian Judiciary: The Need for Reform, in JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
428, 428–51 (H.P. Lee ed., 2011).
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One of the many noteworthy aspects of the Canadian and
Australian extra-judicial experiences is how some of the United States
justices signaled their approval. In 1947, Justice Rand penned Frankfurter his approval of the Kellock-Taschareau investigation.183 In December 1955, Douglas wrote to Menzies his congratulations on the
Petrov investigation as well as Menzies’ defeat of Evatt in the Australian elections.184 “A news account says that while Labor washed its
linen in public, you merely tossed in handfuls of detergent,”185 Douglas
wrote. “But your detergent practically ate up his linen, didn’t it?”186
Frankfurter parroted Douglas’ congratulations in a letter to Menzies
in early 1956, to which Menzies expressed his thanks.187

III. CONCLUSION
While it is reasonable for a presidential administration to nominate attorneys with considerable government service to federal judicial
positions, once on the bench, there should be greater transparency in
extra-judicial conduct and greater use of disqualification than the
historic model presents. As noted in the introduction, this symposium
article is more limited in space than a book or even a full-length
article. Yet, it hopefully meaningfully adds a new dimension to a
discussion on whether there should be a new rule-set on judicial
activity and speech regarding disqualification. Certainly, as a constitutional branch of the federal government, the judiciary has a compelling interest in the survival of the nation’s democratic government.
But this compelling interest should not undermine one of the most
fundamental of rights and expectations of the judiciary–that it be
both impartial and independent. The historic record, as discovered in
various archives across the United States, evidences that judges have
tolerated a weaker standard for applying the traditional rules safeguarding the right to an impartial and independent federal judge in
national security matters. A commitment to transparency–more than
that practiced by past judges–would assist in depoliticizing the judiciary.

Letter from Ivan Rand to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 21, 1947) (on file with author).
Letter from William O. Douglas to Robert Menzies (Dec. 20, 1955) (on file with
author).
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Letter from Robert Menzies to Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 18, 1956) (on file with author).
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